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Abstract
In crowdsourcing when there is a lack of verification for contributed answers, output agreement mechanisms are often
used to incentivize participants to provide truthful answers when the correct answer is hold by the majority. In this paper,
we focus on using output agreement mechanisms to elicit effort, in addition to eliciting truthful answers, from a population
of workers. We consider a setting where workers have heterogeneous cost of effort exertion and examine the data requester’s
problem of deciding the reward level in output agreement for optimal elicitation. In particular, when the requester knows the
cost distribution, we derive the optimal reward level for output agreement mechanisms. This is achieved by first characterizing
Bayesian Nash equilibria of output agreement mechanisms for a given reward level. When the requester does not know the cost
distribution, we develop sequential mechanisms that combine learning the cost distribution with incentivizing effort exertion to
approximately determine the optimal reward level.
1 Introduction
Our ability to reach an unprecedentedly large number of people via the Internet has enabled crowdsourcing as a practical way
for knowledge or information elicitation. For instance, crowdsourcing has been widely used for getting labels for training
samples in machine learning. One salient characteristic of crowdsourcing is that a requester often cannot verify or evaluate the
collected answers, because either the ground truth doesn’t exist or is unavailable or it is too costly to be practical to verify the
answers. This problem is called information elicitation without verification (IEWV) Waggoner and Chen [2014].
In the past decade, researchers have developed a class of economic mechanisms, collectively called the peer prediction
mechanisms Prelec [2004]; Miller et al. [2005]; Jurca and Faltings [2006, 2009]; Witkowski and Parkes [2012a,b]; Radanovic
and Faltings [2013]; Frongillo et al. [2015], for IEWV. The goal of most of these mechanisms is to design payment rules
such that participants truthfully report their information at a game-theoretic equilibria. Each of these mechanisms makes
some restriction on the information structure of the participants. Under the restriction, truthful elicitation is then achieved by
rewarding a participant according to how his answer compares with those of his peers. Within this class, output agreement
mechanisms are the simplest and they are often adopted in practice von Ahn and Dabbish [2004]. In a basic output agreement
mechanism, a participant receives a positive payment if his answer is the same as that of a random peer and zero payment
otherwise. When the majority of the crowd hold the correct answer, output agreement mechanisms can truthfully elicit answers
from the crowd at an equilibrium.
Most of these works on peer prediction mechanisms, with the exception of Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] and Witkowski et
al. [2013], assume that answers of participants are exogenously generated, that is, participants are equipped with their private
information. However, in many settings, participants can exert more effort to improve their information and hence the quality
of their answers is endogenously determined. Recent experiments Yin and Chen [2015]; Ho et al. [2015] have also shown that
the quality of answers can be influenced by the magnitude of contingent payment in settings where answers can be verified.
In this paper, we study eliciting efforts as well as truthful answers in output agreement mechanisms. Taking the perspective
of a requester, we ask the question of how to optimally set the payment level in output agreement mechanisms when the
requester cares about both the accuracy of elicited answers and the total payment.
Specifically, we focus on binary-answer questions and binary effort levels. We allow workers to have heterogeneous cost of
exerting effort. Such a cost is randomly drawn from a distribution that is common knowledge to all participants. We consider
two scenarios. In the first scenario, a static setting, the requester is assumed to know the cost distribution of the participants.
Her objective is to set the payment level in output agreement mechanisms such that when a game-theoretic equilibrium is
reached, her expected utility is maximized. In the second scenario, a dynamic setting, the data requester doesn’t know the cost
distribution of the participants but only knows an upper bound of the cost. Here, the requester incorporates eliciting and learning
the cost distribution into incentivizing efforts in output agreement mechanisms when she repeatedly interacts with the set of
participants over multiple tasks. The ultimate goal of the requester is to learn to set the optimal payment level in this sequential
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variant of output agreement mechanism for each interaction so that when participants reach a game-theoretic equilibrium of
this dynamic game, the data requester minimizes her regret on expected utility over the sequence of tasks.
We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• Since the quality of answers is endogenously determined, a requester’s utility depends on the behavior of participants.
Optimizing the payment level requires an understanding of the participant’s behavior. We characterize Bayesian Nash
equilibria (BNE) for two output agreement mechanisms with any given level of payment and show that at equilibrium there
is a unique threshold effort exertion strategy that returns each worker highest expected utility, when there is no collusion
among workers.
• For the static setting where the requester knows the cost distribution, when the cost distribution satisfies certain conditions,
we show that the optimal payment level in the two output agreement mechanisms is a solution to a convex program and
hence can be efficiently solved.
• For the dynamic setting where the requester doesn’t know the cost distribution, we design a sequential mechanism that
combines eliciting and learning the cost distribution with incentivizing effort exertion in a variant of output agreement
mechanism. Our mechanism ensures that participants truthfully report their cost of effort exertion when asked, in addition
to following the same strategy on effort exertion and answer reporting as that in the static setting for each task. We further
prove performance guarantee of this mechanism in terms of the requester’s regret on expected utility.
1.1 Related work
The literature on peer prediction mechanisms hasn’t addressed costly effort until recently. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] and
Witkowski et al. [2013] are the two papers that formally introduce costly effort into models of information elicitation without
verification. Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] design a mechanism that incentivizes maximum effort followed by truthful reports of
answers in an equilibrium that achieves maximum payoffs for participants. Witkowski et al. [2013] focuses on simple output
agreement mechanisms as this paper. They study the design of payment rules such that only participants whose quality is above
a threshold participate and exert effort. Both Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] and Witkowski et al. [2013] assume that the cost
of effort exertion is fixed for all participants and is known to the mechanism designer. This paper studies effort elicitation
in output agreement mechanisms but allow participants to have heterogeneous cost of effort exertion drawn from a common
distribution. Moreover, we consider a setting where the mechanism designer doesn’t know this cost distribution, which leads to
an interesting question of learning to optimally incentivize effort exertion followed by truthful reports of answers in repeated
interactions with a group of participants.
Roth and Schoenebeck [2012] and Abernethy et al. [2015] consider strategic data acquisition for estimating the mean and
statistical learning in general respectively. Both works do not consider costly effort but participants may have stochastic and
heterogeneous cost for revealing their data and need to be appropriately compensated. Moreover, these two works all assume
that workers won’t misreport their obtained answers.
Caveats: With output agreement mechanisms, workers can achieve an uninformative equilibrium by colluding, which
returns a higher utility for each worker. Our model and current results do not remove this caveat. For static scenario, it is
promising to adopt the method introduced in Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] to rule out such a case; nevertheless we conjecture
that ruling out collusions in a dynamic setting with returning workers is much more challenging. This merits a future study.
2 Problem formulation
2.1 Our mechanisms
A data requester has a set of tasks that she wants to obtain answers from a crowd C = {1, ...,K} of K ≥ 2 candidate workers.
In this paper, we consider binary-answer tasks, for example, identifying whether a picture of cells contains cancer cells, and
denote the answer space of each task as {0, 1}. The requester assigns each task to N randomly selected workers, with N ≥ 2
being potentially much less than K .1 Such a redundant assignment strategy, when combined with some aggregation method
(e.g. majority voting), has been found effective in obtaining accurate answers Sheng et al. [2008]; Liu and Liu [2015].
The requester cannot verify the correctness of contributed answers for a task, either because ground truth is not available or
verification is too costly and defies the purpose of crowdsourcing. Thus, in addition to a base payment, each worker is rewarded
with a contingent bonus that is determined by how his answer compares with those of other workers for completing a task.
Specifically:
1. The requester assigns a task to a randomly selected subset U ⊆ C of workers, where |U| = N . She announces a base
payment b > 0 and a bonus B > 0, as well as the criteria for receiving the bonus. The criteria of receiving the bonus is
1We assume N is fixed, though how to optimally choose N could be an interesting future direction.
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specified by an output agreement mechanism, which we will introduce shortly
2. Each worker i ∈ U independently submits his answer Li ∈ {0, 1} to the requester.
3. After collecting the answers, the requester pays base payment b to every worker who has submitted an answer and a
bonus B to those who met the specified criteria.
The criteria for receiving bonus B is specified by an output agreement mechanism. Output agreement is a term introduced
by von Ahn and Dabbish [2008] to capture the idea of “rewarding agreement” in their image labeling game, the ESP game von
Ahn and Dabbish [2004]. We define two variants of output agreement mechanisms:
Peer output agreement (PA): For each worker i ∈ U , the data requester randomly selects a reference worker j 6= i and
j ∈ U . If Li = Lj , worker i receives bonus B. Note worker j’s reference worker could be different from i.
Group output agreement (GA): For each worker i ∈ U , the data requester compares Li with the majority answer of
the rest of the workers, LM , where LM = 1 if
∑
j∈U,j 6=i Lj
N−1 > 0.5, LM = 0 if
∑
j∈U,j 6=i Lj
N−1 < 0.5 and LM = {0, 1} if∑
j∈U,j 6=i Lj
N−1 = 0.5. If Li ∈ LM , worker i receives bonus B.
2.2 Agent models
A worker can decide how much effort to exert to complete a task and the quality of his answer stochastically depends on his
chosen effort level. Specifically, a worker can choose to either exert or not exert effort. If a worker exerts effort, then with
probability PH ≤ 1 his answer is correct. If a worker does not exerts effort, with probability PL, where PL < PH , he will
provide the correct answer. We further assume PL ≥ 0.5, that is, when no effort is exerted the worker can at least do as well
as random guess. This assumption is also used by Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] and Karger et al. [2011, 2013]. For now, we
assume PL and PH are the same for all workers.
Since workers can choose their effort level, the quality of an answer is endogenously determined. Let ei ∈ {0, 1} represents
the chosen effort level of worker i, with 0 corresponding to not exerting effort and 1 corresponding to exerting effort. The
accuracy of worker i can be represented as pi(ei) = PHei + PL(1 − ei).
Workers have heterogeneous abilities, which are reflected by their cost of exerting effort. When worker i doesn’t exert
effort, he incurs zero cost. A cost of ci ≥ 0 is incurred if agent i chooses to exert effort on a task. ci is randomly generated
according to a distribution with pdf f(c) and cdf F (c) for each pair of (worker, task). We further assume this distribution
stays the same2 across all workers and all tasks, and it has a bounded support [0, cmax]. Moreover we enforce the following
assumption on F (c):
Assumption 2.1. F (c) is strictly concave on c ∈ [0, cmax].
This assumption is stating that the probability of having a larger cost ci is decreasing. Several common distributions, e.g.
exponential and standard normal (positive side), satisfy this assumption. Throughout this paper, we assume F (c), c ∈ [0, cmax]
is common knowledge among all workers.3 Nevertheless each realized cost ci is private information, that is each worker i
observes his own realized cost ci, but not the one for others. In Section 3, we assume the requester also has full knowledge of
F (·), but we relax this assumption in Section 4.
Given that the cost of not exerting effort is zero, the positive base payment b ensures that every worker will provide an
answer for a task assigned to him. We focus on understanding how to determine the bonus B in output agreement mechanisms
to better incentivize effort in this paper. The base payment b doesn’t enter our analysis directly but it allows us to not worry
about workers’ decisions on participation. When reporting their answer to the data requester, workers can choose to report
truthfully, or to mis-report. Denote this decision variable for each worker i as ri ∈ {0, 1}, where ri = 1 represents worker
i truthfully reporting his answer, and ri = 0 represents worker i mis-reporting (reverting the answer in our case). Then the
accuracy of each worker i’s report is a function of (ei, ri):
pi(ei, ri) = pi(ei)ri + (1− pi(ei))(1 − ri) .
When each worker j ∈ U takes actions (ej , rj), we denote the probability that worker i ∈ U receives bonus B as
Pi,B({(ej, rj)}j). In the PA mechanism, this quantity is
Pi,B({(ej , rj)}j) =
∑
j 6=i P (Li = Lj)
N − 1
In the GA mechanism, it is Pi,B({(ej , rj)}j) = P (Li = LM ). Then, the utility for worker i is:
ui({(ej, rj)}j) = b − eici +B · Pi,B({(ej, rj)}j) .
2Realization for each (worker, task) pair can be very different.
3In practice each worker can estimate such distribution based on their past experiences.
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2.3 Requester model
The data requester has utility function UD, which in theory can be of various forms balancing accuracy of elicited answers and
total budget spent. In this paper, we assume that the requester uses majority voting to aggregate elicited answers and has utility
function
UD(B) = P
c(N,B)− b N −B Ne(B),
where P c(N,B) is the probability that the majority answer is correct, and Ne(B) is the number of workers who receive the
bonus. Data requester’s goal is to find a B∗ s.t.
B∗ ∈ argmaxB∈R+P c(N,B) − b N −B E[Ne(B)] . (1)
Notice both P c(N,B) and E[Ne(B)] depend on workers’ strategy towards effort exertion and answer reporting. The
equilibrium analysis in the next section will help us define these quantities rigorously. The data requester is then hoping to
choose a reward level that maximizes the expected utility at an equilibrium.
3 Optimal bonus strategy with known cost distribution
In this section we set out to find the optimal bonus strategy when the data requester knows workers’ cost distribution. Because
the requester’s utility depends on the behavior of workers, we first characterize symmetric Bayesian Nash Equilibria (BNE) for
the two output agreement mechanisms for an arbitrary bonus level B. Then based on workers’ equilibrium strategies, we show
the optimal B∗ can be calculated efficiently for certain cost distributions. Note that due to the independence of tasks, this is a
static setting and we only need to perform the analysis for a single task.
3.1 Equilibrium characterization
For any given task, we have a Bayesian game among workers in U . A worker’s strategy in this game is a tuple (ei(ci), ri(ei))
where ei(ci) : [0, cmax]→ {0, 1} specifies the effort level for worker i when his realized cost is ci and ri(ei) : {0, 1} → {0, 1}
gives the reporting strategy for the chosen effort level, with ri(ei) = 1 representing reporting truthfully and ri(ei) = 0
representing misreporting.
We first argue that at any Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the game, ei(ci) must be a threshold function. That is, there
is a threshold c∗i such that ei(ci) = 1 for all ci ≤ c∗i and ei(ci) = 0 for all ci > c∗i at any BNE. The reason is as follows: suppose
at a BNE worker i exerts effort with cost ci. Since the other workers’ outputs do not depend on ci (due to the independence of
reporting across workers), worker i’s chance of getting a bonus will not change when he has a cost c′i < ci and only obtains
a higher expected utility by exerting effort. This allow us to focus on threshold strategies for effort exertion. We restrict our
analysis to symmetric BNE where every worker has the same threshold for effort exertion, i.e. c∗i = c∗. In the rest of the paper,
we often use (c∗, ·) to denote that a worker playing an effort exertion strategy with threshold c∗. In addition, we use ri ≡ 1 to
denote the reporting strategy that ri(1) = ri(0) = 1, i.e. always reporting truthfully for either effort level.
PA: We have the following results for the PA mechanism.
Lemma 3.1. The strategy profile {(c∗, ri ≡ 1)}i∈U is a symmetric BNE for the PA game if
2(PH − PL)F (c∗) + 2PL − 1 = c∗/((PH − PL)B) . (2)
Denote BPA := cmax(2PH−1)(PH−PL) , the minimum bonus level needed to induce full effort exertion. With above lemma, we
have the following equilibrium characterization.
Theorem 3.2. When PL > 0.5, there always exists a unique threshold c∗ > 0 such that (c∗, 1) is a symmetric BNE for the PA
game:
• When B ≥ BPA, c∗ = cmax.
• O.w. c∗ is the unique solution to Eqn. (2).
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This theorem implies that among all symmetric BNE, the effort exertion strategy is unique for a given bonus level B when
PL > 0.5. When PL = 0.5, we can prove similar results for the existence of c∗ > 0 such that (c∗, 1) is a symmetric BNE.
But this is not a unique effort exertion strategy. In fact, we have a set of trivial symmetric BNE for all B: (0, ·), that is no one
exerting effort combined with any reporting strategy. Nonethelss this trivial equilibrium returns strictly less expected utility for
each worker.
We would like to note that always mis-reporting (ri ≡ 0) combined with the same threshold c∗ for effort exertion as in
Theorem 3.2 is also a symmetric BNE when PL > 0.5. This equilibrium gives workers the same utility as the equilibrium in
Theorem 3.2. This phenomenal has also been observed by Dasgupta and Ghosh [2013] and Witkowski et al. [2013]. Dasgupta
and Ghosh [2013] argue that always mis-reporting is risky, and workers may prefer breaking the tie towards always truthful
reporting.
GA: For GA, directly calculating the probability term for matching a majority voting is not easy; but if we adopt a Chernoff
type approximation for it, and suppose such approximation is common knowledge4, we can prove similar results.
Similar to Lemma 3.1, we can show that the strategy profile {(c∗, ri ≡ 1)}i∈U is a symmetric BNE for the GA game if
1− 2[(α− 1)F (c∗)+1]N−1 = c∗/(B(PH − PL)) . (3)
where α := e−2(PH−PL)2 .
Denote BGA := cmax(1−2αN−1)(PH−PL) we have:
Theorem 3.3. When PL > 0.5, there always exists a unique threshold c∗ > 0 such that {(c∗, ri ≡ 1)}i∈U is a symmetric BNE
for the GA game:
• When B ≥ BGA, c∗ = cmax.
• O.w., c∗ is the unique solution to Eqn. (3).
Moreover we can show that the reward level and the total expected payment if lower in GA than in PA for eliciting the same
level of efforts.
Lemma 3.4. Denote the smallest bonus level corresponding to an arbitrary equilibrium threshold c∗ > 0 for PA and GA as
BPA(c
∗) and BGA(c∗) respectively. Then BPA(c∗) > BGA(c∗), when N is sufficiently large (e.g., N ≥ − log(1−PH)2(PL−0.5)2 + 1).
Furthermore, the total payment in GA is lower than that in PA.
This result also implies that adopting GA will lead to a higher requester utility.
Heterogeneity of PL and PH . So far we have assumed that PL and PH are the same for all workers. If workers have
heterogeneous accuracy {P iL, P iH}i that are generated from some distribution with mean PL, PH , we can show that the above
results hold in a similar way, with more involved arguments.
3.2 Optimal solution for data requester
Now consider the optimization problem stated in Eqn. (1) for the requester’s perspective. For each B > 0, denote {(c, ri ≡
1)}i∈U as the corresponding strategy profile at equilibrium. P c(N,B) can then be calculated based on c, F (c) (controlling how
much effort can be induced), and PL, PH . Same can be done for E[Ne(B)]. Denote the optimization problem in (1) with above
calculation as (PB). Directly investigating the two objective functions may be hard. We seek to relax the objectives. First of for
PA, we will be omitting the 2PL − 1 term as when PL is only slightly larger than 0.5, this quantity is close to 0. Also for both
PA and GA, we again use the Chernoff type of approximation for calculating P cB . We further introduce three conditions: (i)
f(c) is twice differentiable and ∂2f(c)/∂2c ≥ 0. (ii) cF (c) is convex on c ∈ [0, cmax]. (iii) G(c) := 1− [(α−1)F (c∗)+1]N−1
satisfies that ∂3G(c)/∂3c exists and being non-negative.
Lemma 3.5. If (i) and (ii) hold, the objective function of (PB) is concave if we adopt PA. When (ii) and (iii) hold, the objective
function of (PB) is concave if we adopt GA.
For example, exponential distribution (exp(λ)) for cmax ≤ 2/λ satisfies (i)&(ii) for PA; and exp(λ) for cmax = − logαλ
satisfies (ii)&(iii) for GA. It is worth to note above results hold for a wide range of other UD(·)s: for instance the ones with a
linear combination of P c(N,B) and E[Ne(B)].
4This is not entirely unreasonable as in practice this Chernoff type bounds are often used to estimate such majority voting probability term.
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4 Learning the optimal bonus strategy
In this section we propose a sequential mechanism for learning the optimal bonus strategy, when the requester has no prior
knowledge of the cost distribution but only knows cmax. This assumption can be further relaxed by assuming knowing an
upper bound of cmax instead of knowing cmax precisely. Also similar as last section, PL, PH are known. In reality these two
quantities can be estimated through a learning procedure by repeated sampling and output matching as shown in Liu and Liu
[2015], via setting bonus level B := 0 and B := BPA(GA)5 respectively (to induce effort level corresponding to PL, PH ). In
this work we focus on learning the cost functions, which is a more challenging task when the workers are strategic. We are in a
dynamic setting where the requester sequentially ask workers to complete a set of task. In our mechanisms, requesters can ask
workers to report their costs of effort exertion for a task and based on their reports decide on the bonus level for the current task
and for future tasks in a output-agreement-style mechanism.
(P1): We start our discussions with a simpler case. When asked to report their cost, workers maximize their collected utility
from a set of data elicitation tasks and are not aware of the potential influence of their reports on calculating optimal bonus
levels for any future tasks. The data requester’s goal is to elicit cost data to estimate cost distribution and then the optimal bonus
level B˜∗, such that when B˜∗ is applied to a newly arrived task we can bound |UD(B˜∗) − UD(B∗)|. where B∗ is the optimal
bonus level if the cost distribution is known.
(P2): We then consider the case when workers are forward looking and are aware of that their reported cost on a task will
be utilized to calculate optimal bonus strategy for future tasks. We form a sequential learning setting, where we separate the
stages for task assignment into two types: one for data elicitation, which we also refer as exploration, and the other for utility
maximization, which we refer as exploitation. The data requester’s objective in this case is to minimize the regret defined as
follows:
R(T ) =
T∑
t=1
E|UD({Bi(t)}i∈U )− UD(B∗GA)| , (4)
where B∗GA is the optimal bonus level for GA when cost distribution is know,6 and {Bi(t)}i∈U is the bonus bundle offered at
time t. Note UD(·) is mechanism dependent: both P c(N,B) and Ne(B) depends on not only the bonus level, but also the
equilibrium behavior in a particular mechanism.
For simplicity of presentation, throughout this section we consider PL > 0.5: this is to remove the ambiguity introduced in
by the trivial equilibrium c∗ = 0. Also we assume with the same expected utility, workers will favor truthful reporting ri ≡ 1.
Mechanism 1 (M Crowd)
For each step t:
1. Assign the task, and workers then report costs. Denote the reports as (c˜1(t), ..., c˜N (t)). This is a voluntary procedure.
A worker i can choose to not report his cost, in which case, the requester sets c˜i(t) := cmax.
2. Data requester randomly selects a threshold c∗(t) uniformly from the support [0, cmax], such that only the workers
who reported c˜i(t) ≤ c∗(t) will be considered for bonus following PA; others will be given a bonus according to a
probability that is independent of workers’ report (see Remarks for details).
3. The requester estimates a bonus level B˜i(t) for each worker i that corresponds to the threshold level c∗(t) under PA,
using only the data collected from user j 6= i, and from all previous stages. This is done via estimating F (·) first
and then plugging it into Eqn.(2). Then the requester adds a positive perturbation δ(t) that is time dependent to B˜i(t):
Bi(t) := B˜i(t) + δ(t).
4. The data requester will then announce the bonus bundle [B1(t), ..., BN (t)].
4.1 (M Crowd) for (P1)
Suppose the data requester allocates T tasks to elicit the cost data sequentially, and exactly one of them is assigned to the
workers at each time step t = 1, 2, · · · , T . For simplicity of analysis we fix the set of N workers we will be assigning tasks to.
Denote worker i’s realized cost for the t-th task as ci(t). We propose mechanism (M Crowd):
5Calculating BPA(GA) only requires the knowledge of cmax, not F (·).
6Since GA is more cost efficient, we define the regret w.r.t. the optimal utility that can be obtained via GA.
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Remarks: 1. When a worker, say worker i, reports higher than the selected threshold, his probability of receiving a bonus
will be calculated using the following experiment, which is independent of his output: suppose out of N workers, there are
N(t) of them reported lower than c∗(t). Then we will ”simulate” N workers’ reports with the following coin-toss procedure:
toss N(t) PH -coin and N − N(t) PL-coin. Assign a PL-coin toss to worker i, and select a reference answer from the rest
of the tosses, and compare their results. If there is a match, worker i will receive a bonus. Simply put, the probability for
receiving a bonus can be calculated as the matching probability in the above experiment. 2. Since we have characterized the
equilibrium equation for PA with a clean and simple form, this set of equilibriums is good for eliciting workers’ data. 3. After
estimating the bonus level for each worker B˜i(t), the data requester will add a positive perturbation term δ(t) to each of them.
This is mainly to remove the bias introduced by (i) imperfect estimation due to finite number of collected samples, and (ii)
the (possible) mis-reports from workers. Such term will become clear later in the stated results. 4. The fact that we can use
collected cost data to estimate B depends crucially on the assumption that the cost distribution is the same for all tasks.
4.2 Equilibrium analysis for (M Crowd)
We present the main results for characterizing workers’ cost data reporting strategies at an equilibrium. Because of the inde-
pendence of tasks, the effort exertion on each stage is essentially a static game. While for cost reporting, even though we are
in a dynamic game setting, we again adopt BNE as our general solution concept. It may sound more intuitive to use Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) to define our solution in dynamic setting, but we argue BNE and PBE does not make conceptual
difference in our case. Note that workers’ decision on effort exertion is not directly observable by others, and the only signals
one worker can use to update their belief towards others’ effort exertion actions are the offered bonus levels. However due to
the stochastic nature of the calculated B˜i(t), any realization is on the equilibrium path with positive probability (though could
be arbitrarily small). Simply put, in our case there is no off-equilibrium path information set.
Let uti(·) denotes worker i’s utility at time t. We will adopt ǫ approximate BNE as our exact solution concept, which is
defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. A set of reporting strategy {c˜i := {c˜i(t)}t=1,...,T}i∈C is ǫ-BNE if for any i, ∀c˜′i 6= c˜i we have
T∑
t=1
E[max
ei,ri
uti(c˜i, c˜−i)]/T ≥
T∑
t=1
E[max
ei,ri
uti(c˜
′
i
, c˜−i)]/T − ǫ .
Here we explicitly denote the expected utility for each worker as a function of {c˜i}i∈C . Note this is rather a short-hand
notation, as utis also depend on the effort exertion and reporting strategies. The maxei,ri uti(c˜i, c˜−i) term allows worker i to
optimize his effort exertion and reporting procedure based on their cost reporting.
Theorem 4.2. With (M Crowd), set δ(t) := O(
√
log t/t), let γ > 0 being arbitrarily small, there exists a O( (log T )
2
T )-BNE for
each worker i with reporting c˜i(t) at time t such that
max{ci(t)− ǫ1(t), 0} ≤ c˜i(t) ≤ min{ci(t) + ǫ2(t), cmax} ,
where 0 ≤ ǫ1(t) = o(
√
log t/t), 0 ≤ ǫ2(t) = o(1/t2−γ).
The effort exertion game at each step looks alike the static game introduced in Section 3 with the following difference:
instead of workers who have cost ci(t) ≤ c∗ will exert effort, now it is the workers who reported c˜i(t) ≤ c∗ will exert effort.
This is mainly due to the addition of the perturbation term to the estimated bonus level. Meanwhile the mechanism excludes
workers who reported higher than the threshold from exerting effort by offering bonus with a probability that is independent of
worker’s output. Nevertheless, we can bound the fraction of workers whose actions are different for the above two games. We
provide intuitions for the proof.
Over-reporting Over-reporting by worker i will mislead the data requester into believing that finishing the tasks costs more
than it actually is, so this can lead to a higher estimation of B˜j(t′), j 6= i, t′ ≥ t. This will induce more effort from other
workers, which will in turn increase the utility for worker i. We bound the extra efforts exerted from other workers j 6= i,
where we will be utilizing the second step of (M Crowd) that the one reported higher than the threshold will be excluded from
exerting effort (since worker’s probability of winning a bonus will be independent of her report), and the decoupling step (Step
3) where each worker’s bonus level will only be calculated over data collected from others. On the other hand, over-reporting
will decrease the chance of receiving bonus (excluded from effort exertion).
Under-reporting When a worker under-reports, he will gain by having a higher bonus in expectation – this is due to (i) the
fact that the threshold is randomly determined, and (ii) we added positive perturbation to estimated bonus level. The loss is due
to the fact that with under-reporting, with positive probability, exerting effort costs more than the threshold cost. The regulation
for under-reporting mainly comes from the thresholding step of (M Crowd).
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4.3 Performance of (M Crowd)
With this set of collected data, we bound the performance loss in offering optimal bonus level B for an incoming task (or task
T + 1). Suppose we adopt GA, where the optimal bonus level with known cost distribution is given by B∗GA, and the estimated
optimal solution is given by B˜∗GA. We will have the following lemma: (similar results hold for PA)
Lemma 4.3. With probability being at least 1− η,
|UD(B˜∗GA)− UD(B∗GA)| = o(
√
log 2/η
2NT
+
√
logT
T
) .
When we chose η = O(1/T 2), the above regret term is roughly on the order of
√
logT/T .
4.4 (RM Crowd) for (P2)
We propose a (RM Crowd) for (P2):
Mechanism 2 (RM Crowd)
Specify a constant 0 < z < 1, and initialize t = 1. Define p(t) := min{1, log Tt1−z }.
At time t, assign the task; workers then report costs.
Toss a p(t)-coin.
When HEAD, algorithm enters exploration phase:
• Follow same steps as in (M Crowd).
When TAIL, algorithm enters exploitation phase,
1. estimate the optimalBi(t) and its corresponding threshold c∗i (t) for each worker iwith GA, using the cost data collected
only from the exploration phases. Only workers who reported ci(t) ≤ c∗i (t) will be given bonus according to GA; others
receive bonus with a probability that is independent of her report.
2. Follow rest steps in (M Crowd).
Remarks: 1. The dependence on T is to simplify the presentation and our algorithm design. This can be easily extended to
a T -independent one. 2. At exploitation phases we assume there exists a solver that can find the optimal solution with a noisy
estimation of F (·). In practice search heuristics can help achieve the goal. 3. We adopted different bonus mechanisms for
different phases. When we calculate the bonus level according to a particular mechanism (PA or GA), we will also adopt it for
evaluating workers’ answers. 4. When using GA, the independent probability for giving out bonus when a report is higher than
the threshold will be adjusted to a probability of matching a majority voting of the experiment we presented for (M Crowd).
Theorem 4.4. With (RM Crowd), set δ(t) := O(z/tz/2), let z > 1/3 and γ > 0 being arbitrarily small, there exists a
O( z
2
T z )-BNE for each worker i with reporting c˜i(t) at time t such that
max{ci(t)− ǫ1(t), 0} ≤ c˜i(t) ≤ min{ci(t) + ǫ2(t), cmax} ,
where 0 ≤ ǫ1(t) = o(z/tz/2), 0 ≤ ǫ2(t) = o(1/t3z−1−γ).
We have similar observations for the effort exertion game in (RM Crowd) as we made for (M Crowd). Further we prove
the following regret results:
Lemma 4.5. R(T ) ≤ O(T z logT + T 1−z/2) .
Order-wise, the best z is when 1− z/2 = z ⇒ z = 23 , which leads to a bound on the order of O(T 2/3 logT ).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we focus on using output agreement mechanisms to elicit effort, in addition to eliciting truthful answers, from
crowd-workers when there is no verification of their outputs. Workers’ cost for exerting efforts are stochastic and heterogeneous.
We characterize the symmetric BNE for workers’ effort exertion and reporting strategies for a given bonus level, and show data
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requester’s optimal bonus strategy at equilibrium is a solution to a convex program for certain cost distribution. Then a learning
procedure is introduced to help the requester learn the optimal bonus level via eliciting cost data from strategic workers. We
bound the mechanism’s performance loss w.r.t. offering the best bonus bundle, compared to the case when workers’ cost
distribution is known a priori.
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Appendices
6 Proof for Lemma 3.1
Proof. We denote worker i’s expected utility7 for each task as ui(ei, ri; {(ej, rj)j 6=i}) when effort exertion and reporting
strategy {(ej, rj)} has been adopted by the crowd. And we shorthand it as ui(ei, ri). Also we denote by ui(ei, ri; c) worker i’s
utility when a threshold policy c for effort exertion is adopted.
First we show at equilibrium workers will not deviate from truthfully reporting ri = 1. Suppose all other workers j 6= i
are following (c, 1). We consider the following two cases. When ei = 0, the expected bonus worker i can have by truthfully
reporting is BN−1
∑
j 6=i PLE(2pj − 1). By deviating we have the above term become BN−1
∑
j 6=i(1 − PL)E(2pj − 1). Since
E(2pj − 1) > 0 under equilibrium strategy, we know by deviating worker’s utility will decrease. Similarly we can show when
ei = 1, by mis-reporting, worker’s utility decreases from BN−1
∑
j 6=i PHE(2pj − 1) to BN−1
∑
j 6=i(1 − PH)E(2pj − 1). For
more discussions please refer to Section 8.
Let workers adopt a threshold policy c, and truthfully report their labeling outcome ri = 1. Consider the difference in
worker i’s expected bonus between exerting effort and not:
ui(ei = 1, ri = 1; c)− ui(ei = 0, ri = 1; c)
= −ci + B
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
E[PHpj + (1 − PH)(1 − pj)]
− B
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
E[PLpj + (1− PL)(1 − pj)]
= −ci + B
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
(PH − PL)E(2pj − 1) . (5)
Consider the summation in Eqn. (5).
∑
j 6=i
E(2pj − 1) = 2
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c)(1− F (c))N−1−k[kPH + (N − 1− k)PL]− (N − 1)
= 2
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c)(1− F (c))N−1−k(PH − PL)k + 2(N − 1)PL − (N − 1) .
7Throughout the proof we will interchange the wording between utility and bonus for workers’ payoff.
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Consider the sum of combinatorial terms in above equation:
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c)(1 − F (c))N−1−k · k
=
N−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)!
(N − 1− k)! (k − 1)!F
k(c)(1 − F (c))N−1−k
= (N − 1)F (c)
N−1∑
k=1
(N − 2)!
((N − 2)− (k − 1))! (k − 1)!F
k−1(c)(1 − F (c))(N−2)−(k−1)
= (N − 1)F (c)
N−2∑
k=0
(N − 2)!
((N − 2)− k)! k!F
k(c)(1 − F (c))(N−2)−k
= (N − 1)F (c) .
Then set ci = c and ui(ei = 1, ri = 1; c)− ui(ei = 0, ri = 1; c) = 0, i.e., when there is no difference between exerting effort
and not, we have
2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1 = c
B(PH − PL) .
With this it is easy to see when ci > c, −ci+ BN−1
∑
j 6=i(PH −PL)E(2pj − 1) < 0, that is not exerting effort is a better move.
While on the hand when ci < c, −ci + BN−1
∑
j 6=i(PH − PL)E(2pj − 1) > 0, worker should exert effort to maximize utility.
7 Proof for Theorem 3.2, with extension to PL = 0.5
Proof. First consider the case PL > 0.5. When c∗ = 0, we have
2(PH − PL)F (c∗) + 2PL − 1 = 2PL − 1 > 0 = c
∗
B(PH − PL) .
Since LHS is an increasing, strictly concave in c, and RHS is linear in c, we know the LHS and RHS can only intersects once
on {c > 0}. Now we discuss in two cases.
(1.1) First when
2(PH − PL)F (cmax) + 2PL − 1 > cmax
B(PH − PL) ,
we have ∀c > 0 (by concavity, as a combination of (0, cmax): c = ccmax · cmax + (1− ccmax ) · 0)
2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1
≥ c
cmax
(2(PH − PL)F (cmax) + 2PL − 1) + (1 − c
cmax
)(2PL − 1)
>
c
cmax
cmax
B(PH − PL) + 0
=
c
B(PH − PL) .
This is implying that for all effort level c, it is better to exert effort than to not, in which case the only equilibrium is
c∗ = cmax which corresponds to full effort exertion.
(1.2) For the second case, when
2(PH − PL)F (cmax) + 2PL − 1 ≤ cmax
B(PH − PL) ,
there will be odd number of crossings between LHS and RHS of Eqn.(2) on [0, cmax], so there must exist only one of
them (since there are two at most) corresponding to the solution of the equilibrium equation.
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Now consider PL = 0.5. We first rigorously state our results.
Lemma 7.1. When PL = 0.5, (0, 1) is a symmetric BNE ∀B. Besides, there exists at most one more threshold policy c∗ > 0
such that (c∗, 1) is an equilibrium:
(2.1) When B < 12f(0)(PH−PL)2 , there is no such c∗ > 0.
(2.2) When B ≥ BPA, c∗ = cmax.
(2.3) O.w., c∗ is the solution to B = c∗2F (c∗)(PH−PL)2 .
Proof. When c∗ = 0, F (c∗) = 0, so no worker will exert efforts, and the LHS of Eqn.(2) reduces to 0, which matches the
RHS. Moreover as a strictly concave function intersects with a linear function at most twice, there exists at most one more
intersection point (equilibrium point). We again discuss in cases:
(2.1) When the following holds,
1
B(PH − PL)2 > 2f(0), or B <
1
2f(0)(PH − PL)2
we will have for c > 0,
c
B(PH − PL) > 2c(PH − PL)f(0) ≥ 2(PH − PL)F (c),
where the last inequality is due to the concavity of F (·). So for any c > 0, we have for Eqn. (2) LHS < RHS, i.e., no
effort exertion is the only equilibrium, or equivalently c∗ ≡ 0.
(2.2) When B = BPA, we will have
2(PH − PL)F (cmax) = cmax
(PH − PL)B .
By strict concavity of F (·), we know for all 0 < c < cmax (as similarly reasoned for the case with PL > 0.5),
2(PH − PL)F (c) > c
B(PH − PL) .
Therefore we will also know by setting B larger we will have for all c > 0
2(PH − PL)F (c) > c
B(PH − PL) .
Hence effort exerting is always a better move, regardless of c.
(2.3) For the case in the middle, we know there exists (and guaranteed to exist) a unique intersection point, which solution can
be obtained by simply setting
B(c∗) =
c∗
2F (c∗)(PH − PL)2 ,
and solve for c∗ > 0.
Now we prove the following claim we made in the paper that the trivial equilibrium returns less expected utility than a
non-trivial one c∗ > 0. We demonstrate this under (PA). Similar results can be established for (GA).
Lemma 7.2. Under (PA), when there exists a non-trivial equilibrium c∗ > 0, it returns higher expected bonus than adopting
the trivial one c∗ = 0.
Proof. We prove this by discussing two cases. When ci > c∗, exerting effort returns higher expected bonus compared to no
effort exertion, when every worker else is exerting efforts according to the threshold policy c∗:
ui(ei = 1, ri = 1; c
∗) > ui(ei = 0, ri = 1; c
∗)
= (PL(F (c
∗)PH + (1− F (c∗)) · 0.5)
+ (1− PL)[1 − (F (c∗)PH + (1− F (c∗)) · 0.5)]) · B
=
B
2
,
which is exactly the expected bonus a worker can have under the trivial equilibrium. Similarly when ci < c∗, we have
ui(ei = 0, ri = 1; c
∗) =
B
2
,
with which we finish our proof.
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8 Proofs for discussions on equilibrium strategies
We provide proofs for some claims we made in the discussions of other equilibrium strategies. As a remainder, we summarize
the results here:
• Mis-report also induces an equilibrium, which returns each worker the same utility (with the same effort exertion thresh-
old).
• There does not exist effort-dependent equilibrium.
Truthful report
Lemma 8.1. Always mis-reporting (ri ≡ 0) combined with the same threshold c∗ for effort exertion as in Theorem 3.2 is also
a symmetric BNE when PL > 0.5.
Proof. Throughout this section we will shorthand the following notations:
pi := pi(ei), p˜i := pi(ei, ri = 0) .
We first show mis-reporting (reverting the answer in our binary labeling case) with the same effort level is also an equilib-
rium. When all other workers j 6= i are mis-reporting, we will have
ui(ei, ri = 0; c) = b− eici + B
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[p˜ip˜j + (1 − p˜i)(1 − p˜j)]
= b− eici +Bp˜i
∑
j 6=i
(1− 2pj) +B
∑
j 6=i
pj .
Since 1− 2pj < 0, minimizing p˜i, i.e., by setting ri = 0, will maximize worker i’s utility. Also
ui(ei, ri = 0; c) = b− eici + B
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[p˜ip˜j + (1 − p˜i)(1 − p˜j)]
= b− eici + B
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
[pipj + (1 − pi)(1 − pj)]
= ui(ei, ri = 1; c) ,
i.e., the two equilibrium returns the same expected bonus.
Under the binary signal case, in fact the above mis-reporting strategy is equivalent with permutation strategy as studied in
Shnayder et al. [2016]. It is known when signals are categorical Shnayder et al. [2016] (which is our case), permutation strategy
of an equilibrium remains as an equilibrium, and returns the same utility at equilibrium.
Also no other mixed strategy between truthful report and mis-report with mixing probability 0 < δ < 1 will be an equilib-
rium. Denote labeling accuracy for such mixed strategy for each worker i as p˜i(δ). Then observe that worker i’s utility can be
written as follows:
b− eici +BE[p˜i(δ)]E[
∑
j 6=i
(2p˜j(δ) − 1)] +BE[
∑
j 6=i
(1− p˜(δ)j)] .
Depending on different δ, E[
∑
j 6=i(2p˜j − 1)] is either positive or negative. Correspondingly worker i will have incentives to
deviate to δ = 0 or δ = 1.
It is also worth noting that this issue can be resolved by assuming a known prior on the label. We can then generate a
random outcome based on the prior (by tossing a coin for example) and compare each worker’s outcome with this random bit
with certain probability. This will reduce the utility for untruthful reporting. To see this, suppose there is a certain prior on the
labels or outcomes for each task. Denote the prior probability for getting a H as p0H , and suppose we have this extra piece of
information p0H > 0.5. Then with probability 0 < ǫ < 1, instead of comparing worker i’s answer with a randomly selected
peer, we randomly toss a coin with probability p0H , and compare the worker’s answer to the outcome of this toss. This fraction
of utility is then given by
ǫ(p0Hpi(ei, ri) + (1− p0H)(1 − pi(ei, ri))) = ǫ(pi(ei, ri)(2p0H − 1) + 1− p0H) ,
13
from which we observe truthful reporting will return a higher utility, as (i) we will have a higher pi(ei, ri) and (ii) 2p0H−1 > 0.
Effort-dependent reporting
Lemma 8.2. There does not exists effort-dependent reporting at equilibrium.
Proof. As similarly argued in the proof for Lemma 8.1, suppose there is an effort-dependent reporting equilibrium ri(ei). Then
again depending on the sign of E[
∑
j 6=i(2pj − 1)] being either positive or negative, when PH > PL > 0.5, worker i will
choose to either truthfully report on both cases or mis-report to match other’s outputs.
When E[
∑
j 6=i(2pj−1)] = 0, worker i has no incentive to exert effort – so there cannot be an effort-dependent equilibrium.
9 Heterogeneous PL, PH
Lemma 9.1. The claims in Theorem 3.2 and 3.3 hold when {P iH , P iL}i∈C are generated according to certain distribution with
mean PH , PL.
Proof. It is quite clear that with (PA) the previous results hold. The reason is under peer agreement, the utility function is linear
in each worker’s expertise level (consider truthful reporting):
E[ui(ei = 1, ri = 1; c)− ui(ei = 0, ri = 1; c)]
= −ci + B
N − 1E[
∑
j 6=i
(P iH − P iL)(2pj − 1)]
= −ci + B
N − 1E[P
i
H − P iL]E[2pj − 1]
= −ci + B
N − 1(PH − PL)E[2pj − 1] .
This leads to the same equilibrium equation, which will further lead to the same set of threshold equilibrium analysis.
With (GA), for each specified threshold c, a worker’s utility difference (under approximation) can be written as
∂ui = E[1 − 2[(αi − 1)F (c) + 1]N−1] ,
where the expectation is over the randomness in αi := exp(−2(P iH − P iL)2). We first can show:
Lemma 9.2. e−2x2 is concave on x ∈ [0, 12 ] .
Now notice g(x) := [1− 2[(x− 1)F (c)+1]N−1] is concave in x for x ≥ 0 and N ≥ 2, and we know 1− 2[(αi− 1)F (c)+
1]N−1 is also concave in both P iH , P iL (since P iH ≥ P iL ≥ 0.5 we have 0 ≤ P iH − P iL ≤ 0.5, and then we can apply Lemma
9.2), by composition theory. Therefore we have
E[1− 2[(αi − 1)F (c) + 1]N−1]
≥ 1− 2[(e−2(E[P iH−P iL])2 − 1)F (c) + 1]N−1
= 1− 2[(e−2(PH−PL)2 − 1)F (c) + 1]N−1 .
Using above relaxation the rest of analysis will again follow.
10 Proof for Theorem 3.3
Proof. For simplicity we will also write Li ∈ LM as Li = LM . Further denote Ii as the indicator variable for whether worker
i has correctly labeled the instance, clearly P (Ii = 1) = pi(ei, ri). With this we have
P (Li = LM |{ej}j∈U , B) (6)
= piP (
∑
j∈U ,j 6=i Ij
N − 1 ≥ 0.5)|{ej}j 6=i, B) + (1− pi)P (
∑
j∈U ,j 6=i Ij
N − 1 < 0.5|{ej}j 6=i, B)
= pi
(
2P (
∑
j∈U ,j 6=i Ij
N − 1 ≥ 0.5|{ej}j 6=i, B)− 1
)
+ P (
∑
j∈U ,j 6=i Ij
N − 1 < 0.5|{ej}j 6=i, B) . (7)
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Shorthand the majority voting term P (
∑
j∈U,j 6=i Ij
N−1 ≥ 0.5|{ej}j 6=i, B) as P (B, c∗). ui(ei = 1, ri = 1) − ui(ei = 0, ri = 1)
can then be written as−ci+B(PH −PL)(2P (B, c∗)−1). Similarly to (PA), by setting above term to 0 we get the equilibrium
equation.
Again consider the threshold policy, we can further express the majority voting term P (B, c∗) in details:
P (
∑
j∈U ,j 6=i Ij
N − 1 ≥ 0.5)|{ej}j 6=i, b, B)
=
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c∗)(1 − F (c∗))N−1−k · P (
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ≥ 0.5) ,
where we have used [k] to denote the set of users who exerted high efforts. Notice by Chernoff bound we have for each term in
the summation above(when k ≥ 1)
P (
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ≥ 0.5)
≥ 1− exp(−2(E[
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ]− 0.5)
2(N − 1))
= 1− exp(−2(k(PH − PL) + (N − 1)PL
N − 1 − 0.5)
2(N − 1))
≈ 1− exp(−2(PH − PL)
2
N − 1 k
2)
≥ 1− exp(−2(PH − PL)2k) .
The approximation is due to the fact when PL is slightly larger than 0.5, we have (N−1)PLN−1 − 0.5 ≈ 0. Plug back
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c∗)(1 − F (c∗))N−1−k · (1 − αk)
= 1−
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
(αF (c∗))k(1− F (c∗))N−1−k
= 1− [(α− 1)F (c∗) + 1]N−1 .
Plug the approximation into the equilibrium equation we proved the equilibrium equation (3) for (GA).
Most of the rest equilibrium analysis is similar with the case for PA so we omit the details. The only difference is as follows:
notice [(α−1)y+1]N−1 is a non-increasing convex function in y, so we have [(α−1)F (c∗)+1]N−1 is convex by composition
theory. We thus establishes the concavity of 1− 2[(α− 1)F (c∗) + 1]N−1 for N ≥ 2. Then if
1− αN−1 ≥ cmax
B(PH − PL) ,
we will have
1− 2[(α− 1)F (c∗) + 1]N−1 > c
∗
B(PH − PL) , ∀c
∗ < cmax .
Otherwise setting above inequality to equality returns the only equilibria. Notice in our approximation, we have used strictly
greater than or equal to (except for the approximation (N−1)PLN−1 − 0.5 ≈ 0 which will not affect the conclusion above), the
above solution thus provides a lower bound on the bonus level (for fixed threshold) or an upper bound on the effort level (for
fixed bonus) for the original one.
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11 Proof for Lemma 3.4
Proof. Again via Chernoff bound we know,
P (
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ≥ 0.5)
≥ 1− exp(−2(E[
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ]− 0.5)
2(N − 1))
= 1− exp(−2(k(PH − PL) + (N − 1)PL
N − 1 − 0.5)
2(N − 1)) .
Notice
k(PH − PL) + (N − 1)PL
N − 1 − 0.5 > PL − 0.5 > 0,
thus whenN is large,P (
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N−1 ≥ 0.5) can be made arbitrarily close to 1, so that it is larger thanE[
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N−1
Specifically a sufficient condition is given by
1− exp(−2(PL − 0.5)2(N − 1)) > PH ≥ E[
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ]
⇒ N > − log(1− PH)
2(PL − 0.5)2 + 1
Therefore
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c∗)(1 − F (c∗))N−1−k · P (
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ≥ 0.5)
>
N−1∑
k=0
(
N − 1
k
)
F k(c∗)(1− F (c∗))N−1−kE[
∑
j∈[k] I
H
j +
∑
j∈U−i−[k]
ILk
N − 1 ] .
Therefore as B is an inverse function of above probability we will have BPA > BGA.
Now we calculate the total cost for bonus.
B ·E[Ne(B)] = N · BP (B, c∗) = B(F (c∗)T1 + (1− F (c∗))T2) = BF (c∗)(T1 − T2) +BT2 ,
where T1 is the probability of getting bonus when a worker exerts effort, and T2 is the one when no effort is exerted. Through
equilibrium equation, under both (PA) and (GA) we know T1 − T2 = c∗B as:
−c∗ +BT1 −BT2 = 0 . (8)
Therefore
BF (c∗)(T1 − T2) +BT2 = c∗F (c∗) +BT2 .
For T2 we have
T2 = (2PL − 1)P ({Lj}j 6=i) + (1 − PL) ,
where P ({Lj}j 6=i) is the probability the answer worker i is matching is correct. Notice we also have
B =
c
(PH − PL)(2P ({Lj}j 6=i)− 1) ,
we then have
BT2 =
c(2PL − 1)P ({Lj}j 6=i)
(PH − PL)(2P ({Lj}j 6=i)− 1) +B(1− PL) .
First as above we can prove PPA({Lj}j 6=i) < PGA({Lj}j 6=i), and as c(2PL−1)P ({Lj}j 6=i)(PH−PL)(2P ({Lj}j 6=i)−1) is a decreasing function in
P ({Lj}j 6=i) we know
c(2PL − 1)P(PA)({Lj}j 6=i)
(PH − PL)(2P(PA)({Lj}j 6=i)− 1) >
c(2PL − 1)P(GA)({Lj}j 6=i)
(PH − PL)(2P(GA)({Lj}j 6=i)− 1) .
Combined with the fact BPA > BGA we finish the proof.
16
12 Proof for Proposition 3.5
Proof. First as shown in previous proof we have
B ·E[Ne(B)] = c∗F (c∗) + c
∗(2PL − 1)P ({Lj}j 6=i)
(PH − PL)(2P ({Lj}j 6=i)− 1) +B(1 − PL)
= c∗F (c∗) + c∗
2PL − 1
2(PH − PL) +
1
P ({Lj}j 6=i)− 1/2 +B(1 − PL)
Under (PA) we have
P ({Lj}j 6=i) = F (c∗)PH + (1− F (c∗))PL = (PH − PL)F (c∗) + PL ,
which is concave in c∗, and then by composition theory we know the third term is convex, as 1/(x + a) is convex for x ≥ 0
when a ≥ 0.
Consider the last term B. Since
B =
c∗
(PH − PL)(2(PH − PL)F (c∗) + 2PL − 1) =
1
2(PH − PL)2 ·
c∗
F (c∗) + a
,
where a := 2PL−1PH−PL > 0 . When PL ≈ 0.5, 2PL − 1 ≈ 0. When we omit a, we only need to prove cF (c) is convex. This
approximation is not entirely unreasonable when our targetted c is bounded away from 0. We have the following results:
Proposition 12.1. When f(c) is twice differentiable and ∂2f(c)∂2c ≥ 0, cF (c) is convex.
Proof. To see this, first study the convexity of F (c)/c instead. Take second order derivatives we have
∂2F (c)/c
∂2c
=
c2f ′(c)− 2cf(c) + 2F (c)
c4
.
Consider the numerator. First
c2f ′(c)− 2cf(c) + 2F (c)|c=0 = 0,
and further taking derivative of above term gives us
(c2f ′(c)− 2cf(c) + 2F (c))′ = −c2 ∂
2f(c)
∂2c
≤ 0
by assumption. Then c2f ′(c) − 2cf(c) + 2F (c) ≤ 0, ∀c ≥ 0. So F (c)/c is concave. Since 1/x is non-increasing convex on
x > 0, by composition property we know 1F (c)/c =
c
F (c) is convex. Since 1− [(α− 1)F (c∗)+ 1]N and−BE[Ne(B)] are both
concave, we finish the proof.
Similarly for GA, we only need to prove B is convex in c. Since we can write B as B = c2G(c)−1 , we first prove
2G(c)−1
c is
concave, which is equivalent with proving G(c)c is concave. Take second order derivative we will have
∂2G(c)/c
∂2c
=
G′′c2 +G′c− 2G
c3
.
Again G′′c2 +G′c− 2G|c=0 < 0. Take derivative of G′′c2 +G′c− 2G we have
∂G′′c2 +G′c− 2G
∂c
= ∂3G/∂3cc2 +G′′3c−G′ .
Since G is concave and increasing in c we have G′′3c − G′ ≤ 0. Thus when ∂3G/∂3 ≤ 0 we will be able to establish the
concavity of G(c)/c, and thus the objective function.
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13 Facts that are needed for proving results in Section 4
We prove several results that will be repeatedly used.
Lemma 13.1. F (·) is Lipschitz with parameter f(0).
Proof. By concavity we know F (c+ δ)− F (c) ≤ max f(c)δ = f(0)δ .
Lemma 13.2. Denote g(c) := c2(PH−PL)F (c)+2PL−1 , and we have its inverse function g−1(·) being Lipschitz.
Lemma 13.3. Over(under)-reporting will lead to higher(lower) estimation of the bonus strategy.
These results will be mainly used repeatedly to transfer the bias in reported data into the bias of inferred bonus B, and
threshold c.
14 Proof for Lemma 13.2
Proof. First g(c) is strictly increasing in c by noticing:
g′(c) =
2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1− c2(PH − PL)f(c)
(2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1)2 > 0 ,
where the inequality is due to the following fact:
(2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1− c2(PH − PL)f(c))′
= 2(PH − PL)f(c)− (PH − PL)f(c)− c(PH − PL)f ′(c) > 0,
that is (PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1− cf(c) is strictly increasing. So
2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1− cf(c)
≥ 2(PH − PL)F (0) + 2PL − 1− 0f(0) > 0 .
This is also indicating a larger threshold (better induced effort) corresponds to a higher bonus level. And g′(c) is bounded:
min{2PL − 1− 2cmax(PH − PL)f(0)
(2PL − 1)2 ,
2PL − 1− 2cmax(PH − PL)f(0)
4P 2L
}
≤ g′(c) ≤ 2PH − 1 + cmax(PH − PL)f(0)
(2PL − 1)2 .
And further g(c) is everywhere differentiable on [0, cmax]. Then g−1 is also monotone, differentiable and bounded. So g−1 is
Lipschitz.
15 Proof for Lemma 13.3
Proof. Suppose there is over-reporting, for each selected threshold c we have
B˜(c) =
c
(PH − PL)(2(PH − PL)F˜ (c) + 2PL − 1)
,
where F˜ (c) is the estimated CDF for c with over-reporting. Notice with over-reporting
F˜ (c) ≤ F (c),
and thus B˜(c) ≥ B(c). Similarly we can prove the claim for under reporting.
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16 Setting up δ(t) for Theorem 4.2
δ(t) is mainly chosen so that we do not under-estimate B˜, such that that for workers who reported c˜i(t) ≤ c∗(t) will be willing
to exert effort. For different equilibriums, invoking over-report and under-report respectively, δ(t)s are set in slightly different
ways.
Over-reporting
For equilibrium invoking under-reporting, δ(t) is mainly used to remove the sampling bias, as: (1) the contributed data are
already biased towards calculating a high B (Lemma 13.3); (2) for workers who reported less than c∗(t), they have true cost
that is also less than c∗(t), so we only need to ensure a bonus level that is no less than B(c∗(t)). The only under-estimation
comes from sampling uncertainty. We bound it in the following way.
By Chernoff bound we have for each c ∈ [0, cmax],
P (|
∑(N−1)t
k=1 1(c(k) ≤ c)
(N − 1)t − F (c)| ≥
1√
(N − 1)t/ log t ) ≤
2
t2
,
and particularly
P (
∑(N−1)t
k=1 1(c(k) ≤ c)
(N − 1)t − F (c) ≤ −
1√
(N − 1)t/ log t ) ≤
1
t2
.
Denote above small perturbation as ǫ(t) := 1/
√
(N − 1)t/ log t. Notice this small perturbation is parameter free, i.e., it is only
a function of time t, and thus can be calculated on the data requester’s side. Now we want to relate the error in estimating F (·)
to the bonus level B. Notice
B˜j(c
∗(t)) =
c∗(t)
PH − PL ·
1
2(PH − PL)F˜ (c∗(t)) + 2PL − 1
=
c∗(t)
PH − PL ·
1
2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t)) + 2(PH − PL)ǫ + 2PL − 1
≥ c
∗(t)
PH − PL · (
1
2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t)) + 2PL − 1 +
(PH − PL)
(2PH − 1)2 ǫ)
= B(c∗(t)) +
c∗(t)ǫ(t)
(PH − PL)2(2PH − 1)2 ,
where the inequality is due to convexity of function y(x) = 12x+C , C > 0. So with error probability being at least 1 − 1t2 we
will be having
B˜j(c
∗(t)) ≥ B(c∗(t))− c
∗(t)ǫ(t)
(PH − PL)2(2PH − 1)2 .
So simply set δ(t) = c
∗(t)ǫ(t)
(PH−PL)2(2PH−1)2
, we will have B˜(c∗(t)) + δ(t) ≥ B(c∗(t)) .
Under-reporting
For the under-reporting case, δ(t) now consists of three terms
δ(t) = δ1(t) + δ2(t) + δ3(t) .
As in the over-reporting case, δ1(t) is the one for compensating sample bias. δ2(t) is for compensating bias in calculating B
due to under-reporting. δ3(t) is to make sure for workers who under-reported that c˜i(t) ≤ c∗(t), but having cost ci(t) > c∗(t)
will also be willing to exert efforts.
δ1(t) is defined as the sampling bias, which is the same as in the over-reporting case. Now define δ2(t). At time t, for the
selected threshold c∗(t), the unbiased estimation of its CDF is given by
F˜ unbiased(c∗(t)) =
t∑
n=1
∑
j 6=i
1(c˜j(n) ≤ c∗(t)− ǫ1(n)) .
Notice F˜ unbiased(c∗(t)) > F˜ (c∗(t)) , Then define δ1(t) as follows:
δ1(t) = B˜(F˜
unbiased(c∗(t))) − B˜(F˜ (c∗(t))) .
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For δ3(t), notice
B(c∗(t) + ǫ1(t))− B(c∗(t)) = c
∗(t) + ǫ1(t)
(PH − PL)(2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t) + ǫ1(t)) + 2PL − 1)
− c
∗(t)
(PH − PL)(2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t)) + 2PL − 1)
≤ c
∗(t) + ǫ1(t)
(PH − PL)(2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t)) + 2PL − 1)
− c
∗(t)
(PH − PL)(2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t)) + 2PL − 1)
≤ ǫ1(t)
(PH − PL)(2PL − 1) .
Set δ3(t) = ǫ1(t)(PH−PL)(2PL−1) . With above we know B˜i(t) ≥ B(c∗(t)) + ǫ1(t), and then for any worker i who has reported
c˜i(t) ≤ c∗(t), it will be profitable to exert effort. To summarize and help the reader digest, we have the following lemma for
each time step t.
Lemma 16.1. At each step t, after reporting their cost {c˜i(t)}, workers who reported less than or equal to c∗(t) will exert
effort and report truthfully, while those who reported higher than c∗(t) will not exert effort, and report truthfully at a ǫ-BNE for
(M Crowd).
17 Proof for Theorem 4.2: bounding over-report
Proof. Suppose a worker deviate from truthfully reporting to c˜i(t) > ci(t) and denote σi(t) := c˜i(t)− ci(t) > 0. We separate
the discussion based on the impact of deviation on the loss and profit. We separate the utility change by under-reporting in two
parts: loss and profit. Denote them as Ul and Up respectively:
T∑
t′=t
E[max
ei,ri
ut
′
i (c˜
′
i(t), c˜i,−t, c˜−i)]− E[maxei,ri u
t′
i (ci(t), c˜i,−t, c˜−i)] = E[Up]− E[Ul] .
Lower bound the loss:
Deviating to a higher report will result in a c˜i(t)−ci(t)cmax probability of losing the chance of receiving a higher bonus for the
current stage, as we randomly select a threshold and exclude the workers who reported higher than the threshold from exerting
efforts. Then this part of loss can be bounded below as follows:
E[Ul] ≥
∫ ci(t)+σi(t)
ci(t)
((P˜ (c∗(t), ei = 1)− P˜ (c∗(t), ei = 0))B˜i(t)− ci(t)) 1
cmax
dc∗(t)
≥
∫ ci(t)+σi(t)
ci(t)
((P (c∗(t)− ǫ2(t)), ei = 1)− P (c∗(t)− ǫ2(t)), ei = 0))B(c∗(t))− ci(t)) 1
cmax
dc∗(t)
=
∫ ci(t)+σi(t)
ci(t)
c∗(t)− ǫ2(t)− ci(t)
cmax
dc∗(t)
σ = c∗(t)− ci(t) ⇒:=
∫ σi(t)
0
σ − ǫ2(t)
cmax
dσ
=
σ2i (t)
2cmax
− σi(t)ǫ2(t) .
where in above equation P˜ (c∗(t)) is the probability that worker i will match other’s output with threshold c∗(t) and bonus level
B˜(c∗(t)). The first inequality is lower bounding the loss by setting ei = 1 (which is potentially a sub-optimal solution). The
second inequality is due to the fact that B˜i(t) ≥ B(c∗(t) when δ(t), the added perturbation, is large enough. Also clearly it is
also true that B˜i(t) ≥ B(c∗(t)− ǫ2(t)), and the design of our algorithm that only the ones who reported c˜i(t) ≤ c∗(t), so that
c∗(t) ≤ c∗(t)− ǫ2(t) will be willing to exert effort, P (c∗(t)− ǫ2(t)) is lower bounding this probability.
Upper bound the profit:
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For profit, over-reporting will change the estimated bonus level, as the data will be utilized for estimating F (·), and further
the bonus level B. However by design of the algorithm, worker i’s data will not affect its own received bonus level B˜i(t) as it
only depends on the data contributed from all other workers j 6= i. But with over-reporting, according to Lemma 13.3 a higher
bonus level will be calculated and offered to other workers, which in turn will induce a higher effort levels from others. This in
turn may increase worker i’s probability of winning the bonus.
However with probability being at least 1− 1t2 , further increasing the bonus level will not increase the effort exertion as we
have enforced the workers j who has reported cj(t) > c∗(t) to stay out of the bonus stage, and as since B˜(c∗(t)) + δ(t) ≥
B(c∗(t)+ǫ1(t)), all workers who reported c˜j(t) ≤ c∗(t) are already incentived to exert effort. However with probability at most
1
t2 , there is indeed a chance that increasing the B˜(c
∗) will further induce more players to participate, due to a bad estimation of
B˜(c∗(t)), which could be arbitrarily worse than B(c∗(t)). We bound this part of profit. First we prove the following claim:
Lemma 17.1. For (PA), we have 0 ≤ B˜j(c∗(t);σi(t)) − B˜(c∗(t)) ≤ c
∗(t)f(0)
(PH−PL)2(2PH−1)2
σi(t)
t .
The proof is similar to the proof for bounding δ(t)s. The reason we have the perturbation term σi(t)/t is when the worker
deviate by σi(t), this will only add 1t fraction of mis-reported sample at this stage. Now we want to bound the difference in the
corresponding threshold c with (slightly-) different B. Again according to the equilibrium equation we know
2(PH − PL)F (c∗(t)) + 2PL − 1 = c
∗(t)
B(c∗(t))(PH − PL) . (9)
Suppose we have two pairs (c˜, B˜) and (c, B), and c˜ > c, so B˜ > B. We know
(PH − PL)(B˜ −B) = c˜
2(PH − PL)F (c˜) + 2PL − 1 −
c
2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1 .
Since g−1(·) is Lipschitz, denote the Lipschitz parameter for g−1 as L, i.e.,
|g−1(x+ δ)− g−1(x)| ≤ Lδ, ∀x ∈ [0, 1].
We then know
|c˜− c| ≤ L| c˜
2(PH − PL)F (c˜) + 2PL − 1 −
c
2(PH − PL)F (c) + 2PL − 1 |
= L(PH − PL)(B˜ −B) .
Now plug in B˜ := B˜j(c∗(t);σi(t)) and c := c∗(t) we know
|c˜− c∗(t)| ≤ c
∗(t)f(0)L
(PH − PL)(2PH − 1)2
σi(t)
t
≤ cmaxf(0)L
(PH − PL)(2PH − 1)2
σi(t)
t
,
and with this we can bound the additional profit as follows:
1
t2
· P (c˜)B(c
∗(t))− P (c∗(t))B(c∗(t))
cmax
=
1
t2
·O( c˜− c
∗(t)
cmax
) ≤ cmaxf(0)L
(PH − PL)(2PH − 1)2O(
σi(t)
t3
) .
Notice above analysis holds for all t′ ≥ t. Then by a single step deviation we have E[Up] in the future bounded as follows:
E[Ul] ≤
∞∑
t′=t
O(
σi(t)
(t′)3
) ≤ σi(t)
t2−γ
·O(
∞∑
t′=t
1
(t′)1+γ
) = O(
σi(t)
t2−γ
) ,
where the last equality is due to fact the summation series is converging (1 + γ > 1). With the loss and profit analysis, then
when the following holds:
σ2i (t)
2cmax
− σi(t)ǫ2(t) > O(σi(t) 1
t2−γ
) .
there will be no incentive for a further deviation. Since ǫ2(t) = O( 1t2−γ ) we must have σi(t) ≤ O( 1t2−γ ).
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18 Proof for Theorem 4.2: bounding under-report
Proof. We start with stating the following lemma. The proof is again similar to the one we reported for bounding δ, as well as
for Lemma 17.1 for over-reporting, thus we omit the details.
Lemma 18.1. Suppose worker i is under-reporting by σi(t) at time t, that is c˜i(t) = max{ci(t)− σi(t), 0} , we will then have
for (PA): 0 ≥ B˜j(c∗(t);σi(t)) −B(c∗(t)) ≥ − c
∗(t)f(0)
(PH−PL)2(2PH−1)2
σi(t)
t , ∀j 6= i.
We again separate the utility change by under-reporting in two parts: loss and profit. By under reporting it to ci(t)− σi(t),
we see only when c∗(t) falls into the region [ci(t) − σi(t), ci(t)], worker’s utility will change. The expected extra loss comes
from the fact that only when worker under-reports and exerts effort, his expected bonus will change. The extra cost incurred for
exerting efforts is given as follows (as the sampling for threshold is uniformly random over [0, cmax]):
E[Ul] =
∫ σi(t)
0
1
cmax
δ dδ =
1
2cmax
σ2i (t) .
Now consider the profit. Denote the O(1/t2) Chernoff-type event for the sampling estimation as E(t), corresponding to the
error term ǫ(t). We first prove the following results that will relate the uncertainty in F (·) to the uncertainty in B: Again with
probability being at least 1− 2t2 , using Lemma 18.1, the extra profit is upper bounded as
E[Up|E(t)]P (E(t)) ≤ c
∗(t)f(0)
(PH − PL)2(2PH − 1)2 (δ1(t) + δ3(t)) .
With probability being at most 1/t2, the bonus level is unpredictable, but suppose it can be upper bounded by B¯ (for example
the upper limit on the budget for bonus). Then we have
E[Up] = E[Up|E(t)]P (E(t)) + E[Up|E(t)]P (E(t)) (10)
≤ σi(t)[ 1
t2
· B¯ + (1− 1
t2
)(
c∗(t)f(0)
(PH − PL)2(2PH − 1)2 (ǫ(t) + δ3(t)) . (11)
Therefore there is no incentive for the under-report to go beyond the one satisfying (loss > profit):
E[Ul] > E[Up]⇔ 1
2cmax
σ2i (t) > σi(t)
[
B¯
t2
+ (1 − 1
t2
)
c∗(t)f(0)
(PH − PL)2(2PH − 1)2 (ǫ(t) + δ3(t))
]
⇒ σi(t) > 2cmaxB¯
t2
+ 2cmax(
c∗(t)f(0)
(PH − PL)2(2PH − 1)2 (
√
log t
(N − 1)t +O(
√
log t
t
)) . (12)
From both above and the argument for over-reporting, we see a profitable deviation satisfies that
σi(t) ≤ O(
√
log t
t
)(as O(
1
t2−γ
) < O(
√
log t
t
)) .
Short-hand worker i’s utility after t as ut
′≥t
i (c˜i(t)) we have the additional profit is bounded as follows
|E[max
ei,ri
ut
′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t) + σi(t))]− E[maxei,ri u
t′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t) + ǫ1(2)(t))]|
≤ |E[max
ei,ri
ut
′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t) + σi(t))] − E[maxei,ri u
t′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t))]|
+ |E[max
ei,ri
ut
′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t))]− E[maxei,ri u
t′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t) + ǫ1(2)(t)]| (triangle inequality)
= O(σi(t) ·
√
log t
t
) + ǫ1(2)(t)O(
√
log t
t
) ≤ O( log t
t
) .
Therefore over time the total profit for deviations at all T steps is bounded by
|
T∑
t=1
E[max
ei,ri
uti(c˜i, c˜−i)]/T −
T∑
t=1
E[max
ei,ri
uti(c˜
′
i, c˜−i)]/T |
≤
∑T
t=1 |E[maxei,ri ut
′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t) + σi(t))]− E[maxei,ri ut
′≥t
i (c˜i(t) = ci(t) + ǫ1(2)(t))]|
T
≤ O(
∑T
t=1
log t
t )
T
=
O(log T ·∑Tt=1 1t )
T
= O(
(log T )2
T
) .
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19 Proof for Lemma 4.3
Proof. If all workers follow the ǫ-BNE, we will have
σ(T ) :=
∑T
t=1
∑
i |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|
NT
≤ O(N
∑T
t=1
√
log t/t
NT
) ≤ O(
√
logT
T
) ,
where above we have used the fact that
∑T
t=1 1/
√
t = O(
√
T ). Based on Lipschitz condition of F (·) (Lemma 13.1) and
Chernoff bound we know we first have the following lemma:
Lemma 19.1. With probability being at least 1− η we have ∀c, |F˜ (c)− F (c)| ≤
√
log(2/η)
2NT + f(0)σ(T ).
Proof. By symmetry, we only need to prove one of the above.Take |F˜ (c˜∗)− F (c˜∗)| for example. Notice the following holds:
∑T
t=1
∑
i 1(ci(t) ≤ c˜∗ − |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
≤
F˜ (c˜∗) :=
∑T
t=1
∑
i 1(c˜i(t) ≤ c˜∗)
NT
≤
∑T
t=1
∑
i 1(ci(t) ≤ c˜∗ + |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
,
where we have used the fact that
−|c˜i(t)− ci(t)| ≤ c˜i(t)− ci(t) ≤ |c˜i(t)− ci(t)| .
Using Hoeffding bound we know
P (|
∑T
t=1
∑
i 1(ci(t) ≤ c˜∗ + |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
−
∑T
t=1
∑
i F (c˜
∗ + |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
| >
√
log(2/η)
2NT
) ≤ η ,
P (|
∑T
t=1
∑
i 1(ci(t) ≤ c˜∗ − |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
−
∑T
t=1
∑
i F (c˜
∗ − |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
| >
√
log(2/η)
2NT
) ≤ η .
Then
F˜ (c˜∗)−F (c˜∗) = F˜ (c˜∗)−
∑T
t=1
∑
i F (c˜
∗ + |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
+
∑T
t=1
∑
i F (c˜
∗ + |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
− F (c˜∗)
≤
√
log(2/η)
2NT
+ f(0)σ(T ) .
And
F˜ (c˜∗)−F (c˜∗) = F˜ (c˜∗)−
∑T
t=1
∑
i F (c˜
∗ − |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
+
∑T
t=1
∑
i F (c˜
∗ − |c˜i(t)− ci(t)|)
NT
− F (c˜∗)
≥ −
√
log(2/η)
2NT
− f(0)σ(T ) .
Using this Lemma we know
|F˜ (c˜∗)− F (c˜∗)| ≤
√
log(2/η)
2T
+ f(0)σ(T ),
|F˜ (c∗)− F (c∗)| ≤
√
log(2/η)
2T
+ f(0)σ(T ).
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Suppose c∗ is bounded away from 0, that is the data requester is targeting non-trivial effort exertion. Then by concavity of
UD (in F (c)), and the boundedness of its first order derivative for c∗ > 0, we know we have Lipschitz condition for UD. So
|U˜D(B∗)− UD(B∗)| ≤ O(
√
log(2/η)
2NT
+ f(0)σ(T )) .
Since U˜D(B˜∗) ≥ U˜D(B∗) (by optimality of B˜∗ for U˜D(·)) we know
UD(B˜
∗)− UD(B∗) ≥ UD(B˜∗)− U˜D(B˜∗) + U˜D(B∗)− UD(B∗)
≥ −2O(
√
log(2/η)
2NT
+ f(0)σ(T )) .
Take η := 1/T 2, we achieve a regret bounded on the order of
√
logT/T .
20 Proof for Theorem 4.4
Proof. First notice the expected number of exploration phases up to any time t can be lower bounded by
E[
t∑
t′=1
1{s(t′)}] =
t∑
t′=1
min{1, log T
t1−z
} (13)
≥ O(tz log t)− o(log 11−z T ) , (14)
where the o(·) term is to compensate the loss when log Tt1−z > 1. Moreover using Hoeffding’s inequality we also know ∀ 0 < κ < 1
P (
t∑
t′=1
1{s(t′)} − E[
t∑
t′=1
1{s(t′)}] < −κE[
t∑
t′=1
1{s(t′)}]) ≤ e−κ
2
2 t
z log t ≤ 1
t2
, (15)
when t ≥ ( 1κ2 )1/z . This result will ensure at any time t, w.h.p. the data requester will have enough number of sample points
that are elicited from exploration phases.
Under-reporting
For under-reporting, as we argued in previous section, this will not increase the bonus level, but will only increase a
worker’s chance of getting the bonus. An ǫ1(t) := O(
√
log t/t) upper bound was proved in Section 18. However notice with
(RM Crowd), at time t we do not have t samples for estimating bonus level (because we only use data from exploration phases).
Instead we have:
ǫ1(t) ≤
√
logn(t)/n(t), where n(t) =
t∑
t′=1
1(s(t′)) .
Note since
√
log x/x is strictly decreasing when x is larger than certain constant (< 10), w.p. being at least 1− 2t2 we have√
logn(t)
n(t)
≤ O(
√
log(tz log t)
tz log t
) = O(
z
tz/2
) .
Over-reporting
Now realizing the data requester may utilize the collected data to calculate the optimal bonus level, workers have stronger
motivation to over-report, as a mis-report creates more bias in future bonus calculation as the number of exploration data grows
slower. Suppose worker i over-report by σi(t) at time t. Again similar with our analysis in Section 17, the loss with over-
reporting is lower bounded by log Tt1−z
(σi(t)−ǫ2(t))
2
2cmax
. While on the other hand, there is a probability being log Tt1−z , the over-reported
data will be included in future bonus calculation. This additional data will change the future calculation by O(σi(t)n(t′) ), ∀t′ ≥ t.
Different from the proof in Section 17, due to the dis-continuous sampling, the accumulated profit differ from O(
∑
t′=t
σi(t)
t′ ),
since the number of data utilized for calculation is much smaller for certain t, and grows much slower in t. We nevertheless
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can lower bound n(t′) as follows: combine Eqn.(14) and (15), we know ∀t′: P (n(t′) ≤ O((t′)z log(t′))) ≤ 1(t′)2 . So the
additional profit for such deviation is bounded by (changing t to tz log t in Eqn.(11))
σi(t)(
1
(tz log t)2
O(
∑
t′=t
1
(t′)z log(t′)
) +O(
∑
t′=t
1
(t′)2
)) = σi(t) · 1
(tz log t)2
O(
∑
t′=t
1
(t′)z log(t′)
)
Consider the sum series.
1
(tz log t)2
∑
t′=t
1
(t′)z log(t′)
≤ 1
(log t)3t3z−1−γ
∑
t′=t
1
(t′)1+γ
= O(
1
(log t)3t3z−1−γ
) ,
where γ > 0 is an arbitrarily small quantity. 3z > 1 is needed for a converging term. This gives us that any profitable deviation
satisfies: σi(t) ≤ O( 1(log t)3t3z−1−γ ). Also notice the following holds:
z >
2(1 + γ)
5
⇒ 3z − 1− γ > z/2⇒ O( 1
(log t)3t3z−1−γ
) < O(
z
tz/2
) .
The rest of analysis is similar to the one for (M Crowd), with total profit for deviations at all T steps is bounded by
O(
T∑
t=1
z2
tz
) ≤ O(z2T 1−z)⇒ O(
∑T
t=1
z2
tz )
T
≤ O(z
2T 1−z
T
) = O(
z2
T z
) .
21 Proof for Lemma 4.5
Proof. R(T ) mainly consists of two parts: (1) due to exploration phases (2) due to imperfect estimation for exploitation phases:
R(T ) = Rexplore(T ) +Rexploit(T ) .
The exploration regret is easy to characterize:
Rexplore(T ) ≤ [1 + (b+ B¯)N ]O(T z logT ) ,
as−(b+ B¯)N ≤ UD ≤ 1, and the expected number of exploration phases is upper bounded on the order of T z logT with high
probability.
For Rexploit(T ), consider each t that is in exploitation phase. During exploitation phases, workers will not over-report. Due
to under-reporting, the induced answer will achieve a better aggregated accuracy P c(N,B) (as we ensured workers who under-
reported would be willing to exert efforts). But we do loss in term of more offered bonus, as in this case the matching probability
of two answers will increase. Nevertheless there are only O(z/tz/2) fraction of workers under-report, the probability of giving
out a bonus also changes at this order. Thus the over-payed bonus is upper bounded by
∑T
t=1O(1/t
z/2) = O(T 1−z/2) .
Now we bound the regret due to a noisy calculation of B. We know with probability being at least 1 − O( 1t2 ) (such that
the number of samples collected from exploration phases is at least O(tz log t)), we have the average sampling bias incurred by
mis-reporting bounded as
σ(t) ≤ O(
cmax +
∑tz log t
t′=1
1
(t′)z/2
tz log t
)
= O(
1
tz−z2/2 log t
) .
Meanwhile using Chernoff bound we have with probability being at least 1− 2t2 we have sampling bias for cost data realization
can be bounded as: ǫ(t) ≤ O( 1
tz/2
), since we have O(tz log t) samples. Similar to our previous analysis for Lemma 19.1, such
bias in cost data distribution can be mapped to the bias in F . Again using the concavity of UD and the boundedness of its first
order derivatives we know the loss in utility function is proportional to the bias in samplings, which is O( 1
tz/2
+ 1
tz−z2/2 log t
).
Then summarize above discussion we have
Rexploit(T ) ≤ O(T 1−z/2) +
T∑
t=1
O(
1
tz/2
+
1
tz−z2/2 log t
) + const.
= O(T 1−z/2 + T 1−z+z
2/2) .
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Since 0 < z ≤ 1 ⇒ 1 − z + z2/2 ≤ 1 − z/2. , we then have the bound reduce to Rexploit(T ) ≤ O(T 1−z/2). Combine
exploration and exploitation analysis we know R(T ) ≤ O(T z logT +T 1−z/2), and the best z is when 1− z/2 = z ⇒ z = 23 ,
which leads to a bound at the order of O(T 2/3 logT ).
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